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THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT:
THOU GOEST WHITHER?
A CRITIQUE OF EXISTING PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
Regina T. Jefferson*
INTRODUCTION
The Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC") is a longstanding and expan-
sive anti-poverty program.' The program was adopted to benefit the working
poor by means of a refundable tax credit 2 which reduces their federal income
tax burden and offsets the Social Security payroll taxes that they pay.3 Addi-
tionally, the EITC was established to provide a subsidy to low-income work-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Catholic University Columbus School of Law. I gratefully
acknowledge Professor J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. for the opportunity to present the ideas leading to
this article at the May 1994 meeting of the American Bar Association, Taxation Section, Com-
mittee on Teaching Taxation, which he chaired. I also thank Professors Daniel I. Halperin and
William J. Wagner for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. Additionally, I wish to thank
Lauren Bradbury for her very valuable research assistance.
1. I.R.C. § 32 (1994). The EITC was adopted as part of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975.
Pub. L No. 94-12, § 204,89 Stat. 26, 30-32 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 43 (1975)). Since
1975, the scope of the program's coverage and the amount of benefits provided under it have
expanded. The most recent expansion of the program occurred with the Revenue Reconciliation
Act of 1993, which was signed into law on August 10, 1993. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Pub. L No. 103-66, § 13131, 107 Stat. 312, 433-35.
2. § 13131, 107 Stat. at 433-35. After 1995, when an expanded version of the EITC becomes
effective, a taxpayer with two qualifying children will receive a 40% credit for each dollar of
earned income up to $8425 for a maximum credit of $3370. This amount will remain constant
until either earned income or adjusted gross income exceeds $11,000. At that point, the credit
will be phased out at a rate of $0.2106 for each additional dollar of income, until it is completely
phased out at an income level of $27,000. Francine J. Lipman & James E. Williamson, Recent
Proposals To Redesign the EITC: A Reply to an Economist's Response, 62 TAX NOTES 1175,1177
(1994). See infra notes 59-69 for additional discussion of the expanded program.
The refundable tax credit has sometimes been called a "negative income tax." A negative
income tax is a system of cash grants to families where the amount of the grant is inversely
related to the taxpayer's income. Supporters of the negative income tax maintain that a negative
income tax system is more efficient than existing non-cash assistance programs such as public
housing and food stamps. Similar in operation to a negative income tax, the refundable credit
allows eligible individuals who have little or no income tax liability to receive cash payments
equal to the amount of the credit less any tax liability. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 174-75 (1962) (additional discussion on the negative income tax); see also CHmIsro-
PHER GREEN, NEGATIVE TAXES AND THE POVERTY PROBLEM passim (1967) (direct assistance
to low-income households is extension of progressive tax rates into lowest brackets); Earl Rolph,
The Case for a Negative Income Tax Device, 6 INDus. RELt L.J. passim 155 (1967) (credit income
tax program should be implemented to increase tax system's benefit to poor).
3. S. REP. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1975); S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 43
(1986).
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ers for their child and health care expenses and to provide work incentives
for individuals on welfare.4 Finally, the EITC was designed to decrease
overall regressivity in the federal tax system.
5
Under the current structure of the EITC program, there are substantial
trade-offs. On the one hand, the program must ensure that the maximum
number of qualified individuals receives the credit; on the other, it must re-
duce the number of illegitimate claims.6 In its administration of the EITC
program, the Internal Revenue Service has consistently had difficulty balanc-
ing these competing interests.7 As a result, both politicians and commenta-
tors have introduced numerous proposals to improve the effectiveness of the
program.
8
This article places issues concerning reformation of the EITC in perspec-
tive and critiques existing proposals to change the program. This article fo-
cuses on proposals advanced by Professors Yin and Forman which range
from improving the administration of the existing EITC to completely re-
structuring the entire program.9 Specifically, this article analyzes and re-
4. S. REP. No. 36; S. REP. No. 313; see also Lipman & Williamson, supra note 2, at 1176
("In the case of individuals earning the minimum wage, the more they work, the more EITC is
received, enhancing the minimum hourly wage rate .... ").
5. See Explanatory Material Concerning Committee on Finance 1990 Reconciliation State-
ment, 136 CONG. REC. S15,684-85 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990) (purpose of EITC is to improve
overall progressivity of federal tax system).
6. See George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Pro-
posals To Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 225 passim
(1994) (describing results of study commissioned by American Tax Policy Institute to develop
proposals for improving delivery of benefits from EITC); see also George K. Yin & Jonathan B.
Forman, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit Program To Provide More Effective Assist-
ance for the Working Poor, 59 TAX NoTEs 951, 957-60 (1993) (identifying defects in current
income tax credit and proposing alternative method of assisting working poor); Jonathan B.
Forman, Beyond President Bush's Child Tax Credit Proposal Towards a Comprehensive System
of Tax Credits To Help Low-Income Families with Children, 38 EMORY L.J. 661, 670-72 (1989)
(evaluating President Bush's child tax credit proposal and suggesting alternative approach);
Jonathan B. Forman, Improving the Earned Income Credit: Transition to a Wage Subsidy Credit
for the Working Poor, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 41, 43-76 (1988) (exploring history of EITC and
suggesting methods for improving tax credit to serve working poor).
7. See Yin et al., supra note 6, at 236-53 (discussing statistics on participation and compli-
ance in general).
8. See Robert L. Moore, Recent Proposals To Redesign the EITC: An Economist's Re-
sponse, 93 TAX NoTEs TODAY 105-15 (1993) (summarizing and discussing (1) Clinton's proposal
to expand EITC; (2) Williamson and Lipman's proposal to rebate employee FICA taxes com-
bined with a wage subsidy; (3) Forman's proposals, which include increasing size of credit and
adjusting phase-out range for family size, or shifting EITC to wage subsidy credit; and (4) Yin
and Forman's proposal to split EITC into benefit for working poor and family allowance
benefit).
9. See Yin et al., supra note 6, at 261-63 (citing articles which describe proposals). The
authors advance proposals for improving the administration of the existing EITC program, such
as eliminating Schedule EIC and resuming the former IRS practice of awarding the credit to
taxpayers who appear eligible for it, but fail to claim it. Id. The article also outlines possible
changes in the law, such as limiting "earned income" to taxable items only and simplifying the
definition of "qualifying child" in order to improve the program. Id. at 266-74. The authors
additionally advance proposals which completely restructure the existing EITC. Id. at 280-94.
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sponds to their proposals to (1) redesign the Earned Income Tax Credit by
creating a system that uses a rebate of employee Social Security payroll taxes
in conjunction with a family allowance benefit,' 0 and (2) institute an em-
ployer credit program as a substitute for the Earned Income Tax Credit.'1
In order to more completely understand and evaluate the feasibility of
the Yin and Forman proposals to modify the EITC, it is useful to examine the
effectiveness of the existing EITC program. Accordingly, part I of this article
discusses the limitations of the current EITC program. Part II briefly de-
scribes the effects of recent changes to the EITC program under the Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("the 1993 Act"). Part III explores
two of the Yin and Forman proposals to redesign the EITC and analyzes the
policy and equity concerns which these proposals raise. Part IV contains a
brief conclusion.
I. LimrrA'ioNs OF THE EITC PROGRAM
TWo goals of the EITC program are to provide a tax credit to reduce the
taxes of the working poor and to provide a subsidy to offset the cost they
incur in connection with their children.12 In order to evaluate the success of
the EITC program, it is necessary to determine, first, whether the program is
accomplishing its intended goal and, second, whether it is doing so efficiently.
The "rate of participation," which is defined as the percentage of eligible
individuals who actually receive the Earned Income Tax Credit,13 and the
"rate of compliance," which is defined as the percentage of those receiving
the benefit who are actually eligible to receive it,14 are useful in determining
whether the EITC is achieving its goals. In other words, the EITC program
is successful only if the working poor are receiving its benefits and only if the
recipients of the program are limited to the working poor.
A. Participation
Data from the 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participation
("SIPP"), in conjunction with information from selected individual income
tax returns, indicates that the rate of participation in the EITC program is
between 75% and 86%. 15 These figures suggest that between 1.4 and 2.5
10. Id. at 279-86.
11. Id. at 286-94.
12. See supra note 3 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reduction of the federal
income tax burden intended to offset the Social Security payroll tax.
13. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 235. In addition to introducing their own proposals, Forman
and Yin have also gathered data that is relevant to, and useful in, the description of the goals and
cost of the Earned Income Tax Credit Program. See generally Jonathan B. Forman, Expanding
the Earned Income Tax Credit: Clinton Style, 58 TAX NoTs 231 (1993) (EITC should be ex-
panded to make up difference between family earning level and poverty line).
14. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 235-36.
15. See John K. Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Participation, Compliance, and Anti-
poverty Effectiveness 57 NAT'L TAX J. 63, 71 (1994) (participation rates are considerably higher
than other programs directed toward low income population). The two sets of data were linked
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million families who were eligible for the credit in 1990 failed to claim it.1 6
The low participation rate can be explained by several factors. First, the
complexity of the claims process creates a substantial barrier.17 A separate
two-page form, called the Schedule EIC, must be completed to claim the
credit. Completion of this schedule requires wading through several pages of
instructions and tables. The complexity of the claims process would prove
challenging for any individual. However, this complexity may be particularly
challenging for the average individual in a household eligible for the EITC.
Statistical analysis of EITC participants shows that 31% of the households
eligible for the credit are headed by persons with less than a high school
diploma. 18 Another 46% of the eligible population have obtained no more
than a high school diploma.' 9 For many eligible persons, this minimal level
of education makes the complexity of the EITC even more difficult to over-
come and arguably contributes to the EITC's low participation rate. If an
individual obtains and pays for assistance in the filing process, the value of
the benefit is obviously reduced. Thus, the individual is less likely to claim
the credit.
Another barrier to participation is the program's dependence on self-
identification. 20 Accordingly, people who are unaware of the program are
excluded. Also excluded are people who, because of the complexity of the
program, are unaware that they qualify for its benefits. An additional cate-
gory of people excluded are those who consciously decide not to partici-
by Social Security number to the 1990 SIPP data. See also Yin et al., supra note 6, at 235-36 &
n.35 ("The 1990 SIPP is a random sample of 22,994 households which, when weighted, represent
the civilian, non-institutionalized U.S. population. Each of four staggered rotation groups is
interviewed every four months about monthly labor market behavior, income sources, and
household composition. The 1990 file aggregates 1990 household information and fixes family
composition as of January 1, 1991. See Thomas B. Jabine, SIPP Quality Profile, U.S. Bureau of
the Census, Washington, D.C., May 1990.").
16. See Scholz, supra note 15, at 71. Note that these estimates do not differentiate between
various reasons for EITC ineligibility. For example, a married couple that does not file a joint
tax return is considered ineligible and therefore not counted in the estimates, even though they
may meet all other eligibility standards. See I.R.C. § 32(d) (1994) (if individual is married, § 32
shall apply only if joint return is filed for taxable year).
17. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 254-56. "To obtain the credit, an individual first must deter-
mine from the rules that he or she qualifies and then complete the necessary paperwork to
submit a claim." Id. at 254; see generally J. Andrew Hoerner, SOS on the EITC: Complex Rules
Likely To Thwart Low-Income Filers, 52 TAx NoTms 1336 (1991) (due to complexity of form and
instructions, millions of poor taxpayers who qualify for refundable credit will not receive it);
James E. Williamson & Francine J. Lipman, The New Earned Income Tax Credit Too Complex
for the Targeted Taxpayers?, 57 TAx NoTEs 789 (1992) (EITC is too complex for targeted
taxpayer).
18. Yim et al., supra note 6, at 250. See also John K. Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit
Participation, Compliance, and Anti-Poverty Effectiveness, Institute for Research on Poverty Dis-
cussion Paper No. 1020-93, University of Wisconsin-Madison (1993) (detailed description of how
characteristics were determined).
19. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 250. Additionally, the profile shows that in 1990 the typical
household eligible for the credit had wages of $10,808. Id.
20. Id. at 253-54.
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pate.21 The decision not to file can be attributed to various considerations,
such as the belief that the benefit is not worth the trouble of filing, the erro-
neous belief that receipt of the benefit may jeopardize other government sub-
sidies, or the belief that the EITC is like welfare and, therefore, receiving its
benefit would stigmatize its beneficiaries. 22 In short, the EITC's participation
rate indicates that the program has had limited success in providing benefits
to the working poor.
B. Compliance
The rate of compliance is another variable in the effectiveness of the
program. To the extent that ineligible individuals receive the EITC, the pro-
gram is unsuccessful. Data from the Internal Revenue Service shows that the
noncompliance rate has historically been substantial. 23 In 1982, approxi-
mately 37% of the individuals who filed for the EITC filed for a credit larger
than that to which they were entitled, and approximately 29% of the individ-
uals who filed for the credit were not entitled to a credit at all.24 The dollar
amount of inappropriately filed credits was $513 million,25 or approximately
29% of the total benefits paid under the program in that year.26 Statistics
indicate that noncompliance is generally increasing. For example, in 1985,
approximately 46% of the individuals who filed for the credit claimed a
credit that was too large and approximately 40% of those who claimed a
benefit were not entitled to a credit at all.27 As a result, approximately $766
million, or 37%, of the $2.1 billion claimed under the EITC program in 1985
was claimed illegitimately.28 Likewise, in 1988, approximately 42% of the in-
dividuals filing for a credit filed for too high a credit, and about 32% of those
who filed were not entitled to a benefit at all.29 Moreover, of the $5.6 billion
actually awarded in 1988, approximately $1.9 billion, or 34%, was errone-
ously awarded.
30
21. Id. at 256-57. Voluntary nonparticipation may also be the result of fear of the IRS, or
the desire for anonymity and possible tax avoidance. Yin and Forman's findings that "eligible
nonparticipants are more likely to have greater amounts of education, have a greater proportion
of self-employment income, and be employed by private households than the average eligible
family all may support voluntary nonparticipation as one basis for the delivery problems." Id. at
257 n.110.
22. Id. at 258; see also Robert Moffitt, An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma, 73 AM.
ECON. REV. 1023 (1983) (fear of stigmatizing oneself in eyes of others may be key factor in low
participation rate of welfare-type programs).
23. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 247-48.
24. Id. at 247.
25. Id.
26. Id. Total benefits paid in 1982 were $1.749 billion. Id.
27. Id. at 247-48.





The high noncompliance rate can be attributed to both the complexity of
the program as well as to deliberate abuse.31 In order to calculate the credit
correctly, an eligible individual must understand the filing process as well as
the complex requirements of the program. This is no small task. For exam-
ple, the definition of "income" is not at all obvious. For purposes of the
EITC, earned income includes some items ordinarily excluded from gross
income and excludes other items ordinarily included in the definition of "in-
come" for other tax purposes.32 Another example of the complexity of the
program is found in its definition of "qualifying child." This definition is
quite complex and vastly differs from the definition of "dependent child"
used for other taxation purposes. 33 The different definitions of common tax
terms would prove confusing to anyone. However, these terms may be espe-
cially confusing to individuals applying for the EITC, who on average have
obtained only a minimal level of education. 34 Thus, these definitions argua-
bly contribute to the high rate of noncompliance.
Deliberate misrepresentation cannot be ruled out.3 5 Prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 ("TRA 1986"), taxpayers filing income tax returns were
not required to provide Social Security numbers for the dependents they
claimed. In TRA 1986, however, Congress responded to this potentially abu-
sive situation by requiring taxpayers to provide Social Security numbers for
all dependents over the age of five years in order to deter individuals from
reporting fictitious dependents. 36 In the year following the addition of this
requirement, seven million fewer dependents were claimed. 37 This signifi-
31. Id. at 254-60; see also Desiree French, Expert Followed Pattern To Scam, USA TODAY,
June 15, 1992, at 3B (fraudulent claims of dependents made to qualify for EITC).
32. Department of Treasury, I.R.S. Publication No. 596, Earned Income Credit (1993), at
10. "For the purposes of the EITC, earned income includes not only wage, salary, farm, and self-
employment income, but sources such as housing allowances or the rental value of a parsonage
for the clergy, excludable employer-provided dependent care benefits, nontaxable military
quarters and subsistence benefits, voluntary salary reduction amounts (e.g., deductions to 401(k)
plans), and anything else of value (money, goods, or services) received from someone for serv-
ices performed even if it is not taxable (IRS Publication 596)." Id; see also Scholz, supra note 15,
at 81 n.8.
Interest income and dividend income would normally be included in gross income under
I.R.C. § 61, but they are not included in the definition of "earned income" for purposes of the
EITC. I.R.C. § 32(c)(2) (1994).
33. I.R.C. § 32(c)(3) (1994). In general, a "qualifying child" is an individual who passes the
specified relationship test, has the same principal place of abode, meets age requirements, and
meets identification requirements. Id. In contrast, a taxpayer who claims a dependency exemp-
tion for another individual must show that more than one-half of the support for that individual
was provided by the taxpayer. I.R.C. § 152(a) (1994).
34. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statistics relating to
the lack of education among the working poor.
35. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 258-60.
36. The requirement currently applies to dependents age one and over. I.R.C. § 6109(e)
(1994).
37. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 248-50. This was approximately a 10% decline. See also
Missing Children, FORBES, Feb. 19, 1990, at 74 (normal demographic factors only accounted for
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cant decline suggests that many taxpayers, including those filing for the
EITC, were using ineligible dependents.
38
Deliberate misrepresentation cannot be ruled out for another reason.
The EITC is structured so that individuals in certain income ranges have in-
centives to report fictitious amounts of earned income in order to receive
larger credits.39 The EITC is available to individuals with earned income less
than a certain amount at differing rates. If an eligible individual's earned
income is less than a certain amount, the EITC is increased by a specified
percentage for each additional dollar earned. This range of income is re-
ferred to as the phase-in range. The phase-in range is followed by a station-
ary-range in which the credit remains the same regardless of increased
earnings. The final category applies when an eligible individual's earned in-
come exceeds a certain amount and the credit is phased-out by a specified
percentage of the excess.40 Thus, the structure of the EITC is problematic in
the phase-in range where an eligible family receives a credit equal to the
phase-in rate for each dollar of additional earnings. Therefore, both the con-
fusing definitions which the EITC program assigns to common tax terms and
the structure of the EITC contribute to the EITC's high rate of non-
compliance.
41
C. The Timing of the Earned Income Tax Credit
The timing of the EITC benefit presents another difficulty. Most indi-
viduals who receive the Earned Income Tax Credit receive it at the end of the
tax year in one lump sum.42 The EITC program, however, allows partici-
pants to select an Advanced Payment Option which permits individuals to
receive benefits incrementally over the course of the year in the form of big-
ger paychecks. 43 This option arguably increases the effectiveness of the pro-
gram by providing participants with a steady stream of benefits.44 The
Advanced Payment Option is more consistent with the underlying policy of
the EITC for two reasons. First, it offsets the steady stream of Social Security
one-half million, others must have been due to social security regulation). The age has since
been lowered from five to one. I.R.C. § 6109(e).
38. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 248.
39. Id. at 259; see Robert L. Moore, Recent Proposals To Redesign the EITC" An Econo-
mist's Response, 60 TAX NOTES 105, 106 (1993) ("substitution" effect at certain income levels
provides incentive not to work). In their research, Yin and Forman found that those ineligible
families who fraudulently obtained the benefit had less wage income and more self-employment
income than the average family eligible for the EITC. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 259.
40. This is the final category referred to as the phase-out range. Within this range there is
obviously no incentive to overstate earned income. The phase-out continues until the family's
income reaches a level at which the entire credit is eliminated.
41. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 249.
42. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GGD-92-96, EARNED INCOME TAX
CREDIT. ADVANCE PAYMENT OPTION Is NOT WIDELY KNOWN OR UNDERSTOOD BY THE PUBLIC
3 (1992) [hereinafter ADVANCE PAYMENT OPTION] (less than 1% of earned income credit recipi-
ents receive credit in advance each year).
43. I.R.C. § 32(g) (1994).
44. See S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978).
19951
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payroll taxes the participant pays out. Second, it provides an income supple-
ment throughout the year rather than simply providing a windfall at the end
of the year.
45
The Advanced Payment Option, however, has been largely ineffective in
accomplishing its goal. A GAO study indicates that in 1989 less than 1% of
the eligible population received an advanced credit.46 This figure represents a
total of only 40,000 participating families.
47
The same GAO study also shows that compliance is low. 48 Forty-nine
percent of the individuals who received an advanced payment failed to report
the credit on their income tax return and, therefore, appeared eligible to col-
lect the credit again at the end of the year.49 Low participation in the Ad-
vanced Payment Option can be attributed to several factors. First,
individuals may fear overpayment, which means that they would have to pay
the overpayment back at the end of the year.50 Second, they may want to
avoid the awkwardness of asking an employer to comply with the administra-
tive requirements of the Advanced Payment Option.51 Third, the complexity
of the requirements may result in eligible individuals not being aware of the
option or finding it too difficult to understand the procedure to choose this
option.52 Fourth, some individuals may simply have a preference for a lump
sum payment, rather than a benefit paid incrementally over the year.
53
D. Target Problems
An additional concern raised in connection with the EITC is that it does
not target the working poor as well as it should. Certain wealthy taxpayers
45. Under the EITC program as it existed before the 1993 Act, the basic credit could be
received under the Advanced Payment Option, but the supplemental benefits could not. To
choose the Advanced Payment Option, an individual is required to file IRS Form W-5 with her
employer, which certifies that the individual reasonably expects to be eligible for the credit and
that she has not filed for the Advanced Payment Option with another employer.
46. ADVANCE PAYMENT OFION, supra note 42, at 3; see also text accompanying supra note
42.
47. ADVANCE PAYMENT OPTIoN, supra note 42, at 3; see also text accompanying supra note
42.
48. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 247-48.
49. ADVANCE PAYMENT OnON, supra note 42, at 24.
50. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 258.
51. "The employee must obtain and accurately complete Form W-5, not a simple task. The
employer, in turn, must know what to do with the form upon its receipt, a matter that requires
several pages of explanation and several more pages of tables in IRS Circular E, the Employer's
Tax Guide." Id. (footnote omitted).
52. See ADVANCE PAYMENT OFrION, supra note 42, at 2, 14. The Revenue Reconciliation
Act of 1993 requires additional efforts by the IRS to notify eligible persons about the option.
I.R.C § 3507(f) (1994).
53. See ADVANCE PAYMENT OPTION, supra note 42, at 3; see also Stephen D. Holt, Im-
provement of the Advance Payment Option of the Earned Income Credit, 57 TAX NoTEs 1583,
1584-85 (1992) (reviewing advance earned income credit and problems of limiting participation).
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are eligible to receive benefits under the program.54 This situation arises be-
cause benefits under the EITC program are based on the amount of earned
income reported in the tax year, regardless of accumulated wealth.55 As a
result, individuals with substantial interest or dividend income are often re-
cipients of the EITC.56 To the extent that the program provides a benefit to
such individuals, it overreaches. This inefficiency causes the cost of the pro-
gram to escalate unduly. Thus, low participation, non-compliance, and tim-
ing contribute to the ineffectiveness of the existing EITC program, while an
overly broad reach57 contributes to the inefficiency of the program.
58
II. THE 1993 Ac-r-A NEWLY EXPANDED PROGRAM
In an effort to reduce poverty among the working poor, Congress, led by
the Clinton administration, recently expanded the coverage of the EITC.
59
Historically, the program has not been available to childless taxpayers, but
beginning in 1994 the program was extended to certain childless house-
holds.60 Also, the maximum EITC benefit is scheduled to increase gradually
to $2040 by 1996. Over the same period of time, the maximum adjustment
for family size will reach $1330. Thus, by 1996 the maximum total EITC
benefit will escalate to $337061 for families with two or more children, as
compared to a maximum EITC benefit of $2364 in 1993.62 Additionally, the
54. See Cherie J. O'Neil & Linda B. Nelsestuen, The Earned Income Credit: The Need for a
Wealth Restriction for Eligibility Determination, 63 TAx NoTES 1189, 1190 (1994) (EIC benefits
are based on amount of income reported in current tax year, regardless of accumulated wealth of
household). There is currently a phase-out range which prevents extremely wealthy taxpayers
with substantial dividend or interest income from receiving the EITC. See infra note 114 for a
discussion of the phase-out range.
55. O'Neil & Nelsestuen, supra note 54, at 1190.
56. To remedy this situation, Professors Yin and Forman propose a wealth restriction on
eligible individuals. They estimate that a wealth restriction of $1200 in portfolio income would
eliminate 5% of the expected additional cost of the expanded EITC, for a tax savings of over $1
billion between 1994 and 1998. Id. at 1200. See supra note 54.
57. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 252-60.
58. There are still other criticisms and concerns about the effectiveness of the EITC pro-
gram. For example, with respect to its connection to welfare reform, there is concern that the
EITC creates disincentives to work beyond the phase-in range. There are also concerns that the
current structure of the credit imposes a marriage penalty. See Lipman & Williamson, supra note
2, at 1176 (due to lack of information and choices, targeted taxpayers may not react to EITC in
way economic models predict). However, these issues, while relevant and important in evaluat-
ing the existing EITC program, are beyond the scope of this article.
59. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13131, 107 Stat. 312, 433-35.
60. I.R.C. § 32(b) (1994). Childless workers between the ages of 25 and 65 are now eligible
for a benefit that equals 7.65% of every dollar earned up to $4000. The benefit decreases at the
same rate for each dollar earned between $5000 and $9000. The maximum annual benefit that
such individuals can receive is $306. Id.
61. Figures are in 1994 dollars, unadjusted for possible inflation beyond that time. Yin et
al., supra note 6, at 232 n.14; I.R.C. § 32.
62. I.R.C. § 32. In 1993, the maximum EITC benefit was $1434. However, the EITC pro-
gram also provided three supplemental benefits to adjust for family size and special need. Spe-
cifically, the program furnished adjustments for families with two or more children, families with
newborn infants, and families who incurred health insurance costs for their qualifying children.
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1993 Act increases the level of eligible earned income. By 1996, for families
with two or more qualifying children, eligible income will be extended to
$27,000, as compared to $23,050 in 1993.63
Notwithstanding recent changes, the 1993 Act retains the basic structure
of the EITC program.64 It attempts to simplify the program and expand its
scope in order to increase participation and to reach a greater number of
working poor.65 As a result, the EITC program will cost more, but will be
available to more needy taxpayers. 66 The cost of the expanded EITC pro-
gram has been estimated at an annual amount of $24 billion by 1996.67 Not
surprisingly, in view of the increased coverage and cost of the program, con-
cerns about the effectiveness of the EITC have recently increased. Some
analysts worry that even if the program is effective in delivering benefits to
the intended recipients, the costs of the program may outweigh any benefits
that it conveys. 68 Also, skeptics of the program assert that the recent expan-
sion of the EITC does not address most of the program's current problems;
consequently, they believe that the expansion will simply exaggerate the pro-
gram's shortcomings rather than remedy its existing deficiencies.69 Therefore,
in spite of the recent changes made to the EITC, there continues to be a need
to consider alternatives which improve the effectiveness of the program.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE EXISTING EITC
Professors Yin and Forman have advanced several alternatives to the
existing EITC.70 They propose significant administrative changes designed
to improve participation and compliance. 71 For example, they propose the
elimination of Schedule EIC to simplify the filing process so that participa-
The maximum family size adjustment was $77, the maximum supplemental benefit for families
with newborn infants was $388, and the maximum health insurance credit $465. Therefore, in
1993, a family with two or more qualifying children was able to obtain a maximum total benefit
of $2364. Y'm et al., supra note 6, at 231.
63. In 1993, the maximum eligible income was $23,050 with the phase-out beginning at
$12,200. I.R.C. § 32.
64. The act increased the size of the basic benefit and the family adjustment benefit. It
eliminated the supplements for newborn children and health insurance costs. See Revenue Rec-
onciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13131, 107 Stat. 312, 433-35.
65. See id.
66. See Staff of U.S. Jt. Comm. on Tax'n, Estimated Budget Effects of the Revenue Provisions
of H.R. 2264 (to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993), As Agreed to by the Conferees
(JCX-11-93), 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (staff tabular estimates establishing FY94-FY98
spending levels for federal programs in order to meet reduction targets, as required by FY94
concurrent budget resolution).
67. Id.
68. See Jesse Malkin, INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY, Sept. 30, 1993, at 1.
69. One frequent criticism of the EITC is that the phase-out range discourages work. As a
result of the expansion, the program may actually reduce the overall incentive to work because
there will be an even greater number of people in the phase-out range as compared to the phase-
in range which encourages work. See id.
70. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 260.
71. Id.
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tion among eligible individuals would increase.72 At the same time, however,
they note that this would likely result in increased noncompliance because
there would be less documentation, and ineligible individuals could more eas-
ily obtain benefits from the program.
73
Another simplification proposed by Professors Yin and Forman is to re-
peal the Advanced Payment Option.74 They maintain that because the Ad-
vanced Payment Option is highly ineffective in accomplishing its goal of
providing cash year-round to the working poor, it is inefficient to retain the
complex option.75 Of course, if Congress repealed the option with no substi-
tute, the program would completely fail in its attempt to deliver benefits to
the poor in a timely fashion.
These examples of proposed administrative changes show that, as long
as the structure of the EITC program is confined to its existing framework,
there will be difficult trade-offs.76 On the one hand, if participation is en-
couraged by relaxing the filing process, it becomes easier for individuals who
are not eligible for the benefits to obtain them.77 On the other hand, if more
stringent rules are introduced to eliminate ineligible individuals, the proce-
dure becomes so complex that eligible individuals are deterred from filing.
78
It is worthwhile to explore ways of minimizing the tension between com-
pliance and participation under the current structure. In fact, because these
ideas do not require radical change to the current system, they are realisti-
cally, more likely to occur. Thus, such proposals are very important. How-
ever, the issue presented by such proposals is merely one of balance: more or
less participation versus more or less compliance. Accordingly, such plans
are not capable of providing net improvements. In order to find methods
which may deliver benefits more effectively to the targeted population, it is
necessary to look at models outside the basic structure of the EITC. For this
reason, the remainder of this article will focus on the Yin and Forman pro-
posals which substantially modify the existing program and raise not only
balancing issues but enormous policy and equity concerns as well.
72. Most information required by the Schedule EIC could be obtained elsewhere on the
face of the tax return. Id. at 261.
73. Id. The Schedule EIC was mandated by Congress in 1990, and the IRS believes it has
significantly decreased the number of taxpayer errors. See Hearing Before the U.S. House Ways
& Means Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures and Human Resources on Selected Aspects of
Welfare Reform, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (statement of Jennie S. Stathis, Director, Tax Policy
and Administrative Issues, General Government Division, U.S. General Accounting Office), re-
printed in 93 TAx NoTEs TODAY 72-53 (Mar. 31, 1993) (EITC is complex and most employers
and recipients are unaware of Advanced Payment Option).
74. Ym et al., supra note 6, at 274.
75. Only about 0.5% of EITC recipients elect to utilize the advanced payment option. Id.
76. For example, liberalizing access to the Advanced Payment Option in order to increase
its use by eligible participants may worsen noncompliance, because those who currently receive
the advance payment only report it properly 50% of the time. Id. at 279; see also Steven Klepper
et al., Expert Intermediaries and Legal Compliance: The Case of Tax Preparers, 34 J.L. & EcoN.
205, 208-09 (1991) (discussing compliance-participation trade-off in different context).




Professors Yin and Forman advance two proposals which fundamentally
change the EITC program. 79 The first of these two proposals recommends
splitting the current earned income credit into two principal components: (1)
a benefit for the working poor; and (2) a family allowance benefit. The sec-
ond proposal even more drastically redesigns the current EITC. It involves a
shift from the Earned Income Tax Credit to an employer tax credit. 8°
A. Social Security Exemption with Family Allowance Benefit
The Social Security Exemption with Family Allowance Benefit is an in-
novative proposal which overcomes the administrative difficulties of the cur-
rent system and eliminates many of the compliance problems that result from
difficult calculations. 81 This proposal divides the current EITC into two criti-
cal parts. The first part of the benefit would be provided by exempting a base
amount of wages82 from the employee portion of the Social Security payroll
tax.83 The second part of the benefit, the family allowance portion, would be
furnished through a refundable income tax credit based on the number of
children in the household, and would be available to all workers regardless of
income. 84 The family allowance portion of the benefit is a substitute for the
portion of the EITC that provided relief from certain child care and medical
care expenses incurred by low-income workers with children.85 Together, the
Social Security Exemption and Family Allowance Benefit would theoretically
satisfy the objectives of the EITC program.86 However, unlike the current
EITC, both the Social Security Exemption and the Family Allowance Benefit
would be available to high-income households to the same extent that it
would be available to low-income households.
Professors Yin and Forman's alternative to the EITC improves the pres-
ent structure in four ways. First, the Social Security Exemption eliminates
the problem of non-filers because it is not based on self-identification. Low-
79. These proposals could potentially enhance participation, compliance, and timeliness
through much larger changes to the tax system. Id. at 280-94.
80. Id. at 286-94.
81. Id. at 280-86.
82. Id. at 281. The proposed exemption would not apply to the employer's portion of Social
Security taxes. Therefore, the portion of Social Security taxes paid by the employer would not
be affected by the proposed exemption.
83. Id. The authors maintain that a Social Security tax exemption available only to low
income workers would result in little improvement in the administration of the benefit. Self-
identification would be necessary and participants would need to identify themselves to their
employers, increasing the possibility of stigmatization. Furthermore, a Social Security tax return
might later need to be filed if persons benefitting are later found to be ineligible. Id.
84. Id. at 283. If the Family Allowance Benefit were substituted for the current dependency
exemption, it would result in a shift of benefits in favor of lower-income families.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see also C. Eugene Steuerle, Tax Credits for Low-Income Workers with Children, 4
J. ECON. PERsp. 201, 206 (1990) (discussing equity and efficiency implications of four commonly
stated purposes of credits: greater progressivity; adjustments for children; greater choice of
goods and services; greater work incentives for low-income individuals).
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wage individuals automatically receive the benefit.87 Second, by directly pro-
viding a Social Security rebate, or income supplement, to the working poor,
the Social Security Exemption accomplishes one of the specified goals of the
EITC program by offsetting the costs incurred by the working poor in con-
nection with certain expenses.88 Third, this approach is more efficient than
the existing program because the rebate is accomplished in one step as op-
posed to the current two-step process.89 Fourth, it delivers the benefit in a
timely manner because each paycheck reflects a portion of the annual
benefit.90
While the Social Security Exemption and Family Allowance Benefit al-
ternative makes significant improvements to the current program, it achieves
these improvements at a substantial cost. This proposal creates new
problems by requiring additional funding. It also exacerbates current
problems of over-inclusion and perception.
1. Funding the additional cost of the proposal
Yin and Forman propose to fund the Social Security Exemption and
Family Allowance Benefit by either increasing the Social Security payroll
taxes on wages in excess of the proposed exemption amount or raising the
earnings cap for the Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance portion
(OASDI) of Social Security.91 These funding proposals suggest that the addi-
tional cost could be funded by increasing the payroll tax on earnings in excess
of the proposed exemption amount but leaving the earnings cap unchanged,
by raising the earnings cap without increasing the payroll tax, or by both
raising the earnings cap and increasing the payroll tax rate on amounts in
excess of the proposed exemption amount.
The Social Security payroll tax is a flat-rate tax paid on all employment
wages up to a specified limit. 92 This limit is referred to as the "earnings
cap." 93 The earnings cap is increased every year to keep pace with wage
growth.94 In 1993, all earnings up to $57,600 were subject to the 15.3% pay-
roll tax, which is split evenly between the employer and the employee. The
87. The benefit is included in each paycheck. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 284.
88. This is consistent with the original rationales of the EITC program. Id. at 280-81.
89. Id. at 281. "The current system of first collecting such taxes and then refunding them by
means of the EITC is administratively unwieldy. It would be simpler not to collect the Social
Security taxes in the first instance." Id.
90. Delivered in this manner, the benefit is much more visible and the problem of nonpar-
ticipation is eliminated. Id. at 284.
91. Id. at 281-82. In 1993, wages above $57,600 were not subject to the OASDI portions of
the Social Security tax, and wages above $135,000 were not subject to the Medicare portion of
the tax. The Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 removed the latter cap altogether, effective in
1994, but retained the former one. The earnings cap for 1994 was increased to $60,600. Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13207, 107 Stat. 312, 468 (1993).
92. C. Eugene Steuerle & Jon M. Bakija, Basic Features of the Social Security System, 62





earnings cap was increased to $60,600 for 1994.9 5 Wages above the earnings
cap are not subject to the Social Security payroll tax at all.96
Thus, the Social Security payroll tax, when viewed independently of ben-
efits, is regressive because the earnings cap causes the tax to apply to a
greater percentage of low-income wages than to high-income wages.97 To
illustrate, consider two workers. One has annual earnings of $20,000 and the
other $200,000. Because the Social Security tax is comprised of both an em-
ployee portion equaling 7.65% of salary, as well as an employer portion
equaling 7.65% of salary, the individual who earns $20,000 pays 15.3% of her
wages in payroll taxes.98 In contrast, the higher income worker pays only
95. 1994 Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,004, 58,005-06
(1993).
96. Steuerle & Bakija, supra note 92, at 1457.
97. Id. at 1458. In contrast to the Social Security payroll tax, benefit distributions are
progressive since they are not directly based on payroll tax contributions, but rather on earnings
on which the taxes were paid. Therefore, low-income individuals who pay relatively smaller
amounts in total payroll taxes receive a much larger percentage of wage replacement at retire-
ment than high-income individuals. The Social Security replacement rate is calculated as a per-
centage of the individual's previous annual wages replaced by Social Security benefits. C.
Eugene Steuerle & John M. Bakija, How Social Security Redistributes Income, 62 TAX NOTES
1763, 1765 (1994). Generally, replacement rates are expressed as a percentage of wages in the
last year preceding retirement, or as a percentage of the average wage determined over the three
highest-earnings years. Id.; see also id. at 1763-66 (further discussing calculation of real value of
Social Security benefits).
The above analysis is based on the tax-transfer model of Social Security, which is one of
three competing conceptual models. See Lawrence H. Thompson, The Social Security Reform
Debate, 21 J. ECON. LrrERATuRE 1425, 1436-38 (1983). The tax-transfer model views Social
Security as merely one of several government tax-transfer programs in which the benefits re-
ceived by an individual need not bear any particular relationship to the taxes that that individual
may have paid into the Social Security system. Id. at 1436. Thus, under this model, since the
revenue and expenditure sides of the program are evaluated separately, the Social Security pay-
roll tax is regressive. Id.
Another model is the insurance model, which maintains that the primary element of Social
Security is the pooling among all workers of the risks of earnings losses due to retirement, death,
or disability. Id. at 1437. Since all of these events are integral parts of the insurance program,
this model maintains that the taxes and benefits cannot be separately analyzed. Id. Thus, under
this model, the Social Security payroll tax would not be considered as regressive as under the
tax-transfer model.
The third model is the annuity-welfare model. Id. In this model, the benefit structure is
broken down into both a social adequacy component and an individual equity component. Id.
Each of these components is analyzed separately. Id. The social adequacy component is ana-
lyzed as if it were a separate tax-transfer program, and the individual equity component is
viewed as analogous to forced savings. Id. Again, under this model, the Social Security payroll
tax is not considered as regressive as under the tax-transfer model.
The three different models result in contrasting insights about the fairness of benefit distri-
butions, the costs of the Social Security system, and the degrees of regressivity in the Social
Security payroll tax. Id. at 1438.
98. Many economists agree that practically all of the burden of the employer portion of the
Social Security tax falls on the employee, who pays the employer's portion in the form of re-
duced wages. Steuerle & Bakija, supra note 92, at 1457; see also RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE &
PEGGY B. MUSGRAvE, PUBLic FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRAcTcE 495-97 (4th ed. 1984) (dem-
onstrating that employer and employee contributions to payroll tax produce the tax burden). In
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4.4% 99 of her wages in payroll taxes. Therefore, when measured as a per-
centage of compensation, the payroll tax is extremely regressive. When the
payroll tax is expressed as a percentage of total income, it is even more re-
gressive since highly compensated individuals are more likely to have income
from sources other than wages. 1°°
As stated earlier, one of the methods Yin and Forman propose to
fund the additional cost of the Social Security Exemption and Family Allow-
ance Benefit is by increasing the payroll tax on wages above the exempted
amount without requiring the removal of the earnings cap.' 01 However, this
funding method would further increase the regressivity of the Social Security
payroll tax.102 Assume, for instance, that the earnings cap remained at
$60,600103 and that the exemption amount was the first $8840 of compensa-
a competitive market, an employer will pay a worker total compensation, including cash wages,
contributions to Social Security, and employee benefits, commensurate with the value of output
produced by the worker. Thus, if the amount of total compensation is fixed, an increase in the
employer portion of the payroll tax would necessarily imply an equal decrease in some other
form of compensation, such as cash wages. Steuerle & Bakija, supra note 92, at 1457-58.
99. The calculation is as follows: 15.3% of $57,600 (earnings cap) is $8813, $8813 is 4.4% of
$200,000. In contrast, 15.3% of $20,000 is $3060, and $3060 is 15.3% of $20,000.
100. Steuerle & Bakija, supra note 92, at 1458. In addition to the fact that no taxes are
collected above the earnings cap, two other features of the payroll tax contribute to its regressiv-
ity. First, Social Security retirement taxes are imposed on "covered earnings," which is a much
narrower and more regressive tax base than the income tax base because the concept of covered
earnings excludes items like interest and investment income. Second, unlike the income tax
which provides standard deductions and personal exemptions, the Social Security payroll tax is
imposed on the first dollars of covered earnings. Jonathan B. Forman, Promoting Fairness in the
Social Security Retirement Program: Partial Integration and a Credit for Dual-Earner Couples, 45
TAX LAW. 915, 928-31 (1992).
101. Tax equity requires that persons with equal ability to pay taxes should pay equal
amounts of tax. This theory is referred to as "horizontal equity." Tax equity also requires that
individuals with greater ability to pay should have a greater tax burden. This theory is referred
to as "vertical equity." MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 17 (2d ed. 1988). Accordingly, the removal of the earnings cap is necessary to ensure
vertical equity in the tax system so that individuals with greater income pay more Social Security
taxes.
102. Some increase in the payroll tax rate would be necessary to prevent taxpayers with
wages above the exempted amount from experiencing an overall decrease in their payroll taxes.
To illustrate, assume that the first $8840 (minimum wage) of wages were exempted from the
payroll tax and that there were no increase in the payroll tax rate. Individuals with income
above the exempted amount would experience a decrease in payroll tax payments because the
first $8840 of their wages would escape the payroll tax. Thus, a rate increase calculated to offset
the tax savings that an individual experienced with respect to the exempted amount would be
necessary to prevent taxpayers who are not the intended beneficiaries of the exemption from
enjoying an overall reduction in their payroll taxes.
103. Beginning in 1994, wages above $60,600 are not subject to the OASDI portions of the
Social Security tax. 1994 Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations, 58 Fed. Reg.
58,004, 58,005-06 (1993). Additionally, the $135,000 earnings cap on wages subject to the Medi-
care portion of the tax was entirely removed. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-66, § 13207(a), (e), 107 Stat. 312, 468 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 312 (1988
& Supp. V 1993)).
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tion, or the minimum wage annual salary. 104 If the Social Security tax rate
were increased to pay for the Social Security exemption, and the earnings cap
remained constant, individuals earning between $8840 and $60,600 would
bear the full cost of the additional expense of the program. Of course, those
same individuals would also experience some decrease in their payroll taxes
because the first $8840 of their compensation would be exempted from Social
Security taxes. Consequently, it would be both appropriate and necessary to
increase the rates by some factor in order to maintain the current tax rate
structure for non-targeted individuals.105 If the increased rate were calcu-
lated to offset the decrease in payroll tax payments resulting from the ex-
empted wages, taxpayers in this group would be no better or worse off after a
rate increase. However, a rate increase beyond this break-even point would
present equity problems. Middle-income individuals would be forced to pay
substantially higher taxes on amounts not exempted from the payroll tax;
while individuals earning higher wages, who presumably would be better able
to afford tax increases, would not be affected to the same degree because
they would pay no Social Security tax on wages in excess of the $60,600 earn-
ings cap. Therefore, substantially increasing tax rates above the exemption
amount without first removing the earnings cap would increase vertical ineq-
uities with respect to the payment of Social Security taxes. As a result, the
Social Security payroll tax would be even more regressive than it is today.1°6
This result is particularly inappropriate because it is inconsistent with
one of the explicit purposes of the EITC program. As stated earlier, one goal
of the Earned Income Tax Credit is to combat regressiveness in the federal
tax system. 1' 7 This proposed method of funding would not only fail to re-
duce regressivity but could actually increase regressivity in the tax system.
Thus, from a policy standpoint, this approach to funding a program offered as
a substitute for the EITC would be totally unacceptable.
Another method of funding the additional cost of the program would be
to eliminate the earnings cap without raising the tax rate. However, because
only a relatively small percentage of wages and salaries exceed the earnings
cap, it is unlikely that this method would increase revenue sufficiently to off-
104. The calculation is as follows: $4.25 per hour (minimum wage) x 40 hours per week x 52
weeks per year = $8840.
105. This factor would be determined by calculating the rate increase necessary to offset the
taxes not collected on the exempted amounts.
106. See supra note 97 and accompanying text for a discussion of regressivity in the tax
system.
107. See Explanatory Material Concerning Committee on Finance 1990 Reconciliation Sub-
mission Pursuant to House Concurrent Resolution, 310 CONo. REc. S15685 (daily ed. Oct. 18,
1990) (stating that EITC provides important means for achieving progressivity in tax system);
President William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration
Goals (Feb. 17, 1993), in 1 PuB. PAPERS 113, 117 (1993) (proposing expansion of EITC to com-
bat poverty).
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set the additional cost of the proposed program. l08 Estimates indicate that
approximately 87% of wages fall below the earnings cap. These figures sug-
gest that a complete elimination of the earnings cap would increase revenue
by only approximately 12%. Thus, the amount of revenue that could be
raised by removing the earnings cap is quite modest. Therefore, the ap-
proach for funding the additional cost of the proposal should require both
removing the earnings cap and increasing the payroll tax rate, but not one or
the other. 10 9
2. Targeting the poor
Professors Yin and Forman note that their proposal does not target the
poor as well as the current EITC program because the Social Security Ex-
emption and Family Allowance Benefit which they propose apply to all indi-
viduals regardless of income." 0 However, in order to better target the
working poor, they suggest that benefits from the Social Security Exemption
be based on weekly wages as opposed to annual wages."' This method
would prevent those seasonal employees who earn relatively low annual
wages but relatively high weekly wages from enjoying the benefits of the So-
cial Security Exemption."
2
The use of hourly wages would be an even more effective device to elim-
inate such unintended beneficiaries. Hourly wages would also exclude indi-
viduals performing part-time services year-round who, on the basis of weekly
wages, may benefit from the exemption. For example, college students who
tutor three times a week at hourly rates of twenty dollars and above may
qualify on a weekly basis, but would not qualify on an hourly basis. Typically,
part-time workers, including students, are not sole supporters of their fami-
lies and consequently would receive financial support from working spouses
or other family members. 1 3 Thus, it is appropriate that such individuals be
108. See C. Eugene Steuerle & Jon M. Bakija, Options for Reforming the Social Security
Payroll Tax, 63 TAX NoTEs 109, 114 (1994) (explaining that eliminating earnings cap would raise
revenues one-ninth above current levels).
109. While the payment of Social Security taxes is regressive, the benefit structure is not.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text for a discussion of regressivity in the tax system. Thus,
the removal of the earnings cap may raise concerns about the structure of Social Security bene-
fits. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text for a general discussion on Social Security
payments and the structure of Social Security benefits.
110. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 285. "Workers with low annual wage income but high capi-
tal income could nevertheless benefit from the Social Security tax exemption without any recap-
ture." Id.
111. For instance, the exemption could be limited to the first $170 of wages per week (the
minimum weekly wage). Id.
112. This approach would eliminate such people as affluent teenagers or college students
who hold summer jobs, as well as low-wage or part-time workers who have wealthy spouses. Id.
113. Results from a survey conducted by the Bureau of Census on the work experience of
wives supports this assertion. For example, the study shows that in 1992 there were 10,228,000
women who worked part-time in the work force; only 8,470,000 of their husbands worked full-
time. This figure represents approximately 80% of the part-time workers studied. U.S. Bureau
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excluded from receiving the benefits of a program designed for the working
poor.
The hourly wage solution does not address the situation where an indi-
vidual has high capital income and low wages, however.'1 4 This individual,
while not poor, would still benefit under the proposed program.'1 5 Although
the Social Security Exemption and Family Allowance Benefit does not rem-
edy this problem, it does not create or exacerbate the problem either. The
same problem exists today under the current EITC program because individ-
uals who have substantial capital income but low wages are eligible to partici-
pate in the program.
116
Thus, using a shorter period of time over which to measure compensa-
tion would alone remedy many problems of effectively targeting the working
poor. However, remedying the targeting problem of Yin and Forman's pro-
posal may be easier than remedying the funding problems discussed earlier
and the perception problems discussed next.
3. Perception
In order for any program to be successful, it must not only accomplish its
goals, but also must appear to do so. Perception is particularly important in
determining the popularity of a poverty program." 7 Perhaps the biggest
problem that Yin and Forman's proposal will encounter is one of perception.
Under Yin and Forman's Social Security Exemption and Family Allowance
Benefit proposal, everybody enjoys the benefits regardless of income. This
proposal is advantageous because it eliminates administrative difficulties." 8
Specifically, there would be few, if any, problems with compliance or partici-
pation. However, this proposal may be disadvantageous because, by provid-
of Labor Statistics, Division of Labor Force Statistics, Study Conducted by the U.S. Bureau of
Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics, tbls. 21-22, at 2 (Mar. 1993) (unpublished).
114. In an attempt to restrict the EITC to low-wage workers, Congress instituted a phase-
out range so that the maximum amount of the credit is reduced by a percentage of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income (earned income if it is higher) in excess of $11,000. In the case of taxpay-
ers who have no qualifying children, the maximum amount is reduced by a percentage of ad-
justed gross income in excess of $5000. I.R.C. § 32(a)(2)(b) (Supp. V 1993). This limitation
prevents extremely well-to-do people with substantial dividend and interest income from receiv-
ing the credit.
115. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of targeting the working
poor.
116. O'Neil & Nelsestuen, supra note 54, at 1190; see also Jonathan B. Forman, Expanding
the Earned Income Credit To Help the Working Poor, 40 TAX NoTEs 851, 854 (1988) (stating that
EITC would be fairer and more efficient if structured to benefit only hard-working, needy peo-
ple). See supra note 114 for a discussion of the phase-out range which prevents extremely
wealthy taxpayers with substantial dividend or interest income from receiving the EITC.
117. See generally JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHFSKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUC-
TION OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN AMERiCA (1991) (tracing historical development of
political and cultural attitudes toward poor).
118. The universality of the benefit would eliminate the need for self-identification, improv-
ing the administration of the benefit. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 281, 284.
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ing benefits to individuals high up the income tree, it strays from the EITC
program's anti-poverty roots.
This apparent departure from the underlying policy of the EITC pro-
gram is significant. One of the reasons given for the enduring popularity of
the EITC program is that it is viewed as being fairly well-targeted, because
only people with low incomes are eligible to receive its benefits. 119 Support
for the program presently crosses party lines and comes from a cross-section
of the population.120 However, the apparent deviation of the Social Security
Exemption and Family Allowance Benefit from an anti-poverty objective
could threaten political support for the program. Although the proposed
program may be an improvement over the current EITC in many respects,
the improvements may be achieved at the cost of creating perception
problems. Because Yin and Forman's proposal may not appear to be limited
to reducing poverty among the working poor, it may not inherit the EITC's
political support.
121
B. Employer Credit Program
As another alternative to the EITC program, Professors Yin and Forman
propose a wage subsidy scheme implemented through a tax benefit directed
to the employer rather than to the employee. 122 Under this approach, em-
ployers of certain low-wage workers would receive a benefit in the form of a
tax credit.' 23 The credit would be determined as a percentage of salary paid
to low-wage employees, presumably with some range of phase-in up to a cer-
tain point and some range of phase-out after another. 124 Theoretically, a
benefit targeting the working poor, like the EITC, could be delivered more
efficiently to the employer who would then pass on the benefit to the low-
wage worker. 125
119. See Julie Kosterlitz, Birth and Taxes, 23 NAT'L J. 1857, 1859 (1991) (explaining that
Democrats prefer tax credit because it provides more benefits to lower and middle-income peo-
ple than expanded dependent's exemption favored by Republicans). At the same time, one
reason people eligible for the EITC give for not applying for the benefit is the stigma attached to
receiving what they perceive as welfare. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
120. Democrats support the EITC program because it helps those at the bottom of the
economic ladder without being welfare, while Republicans support the program as an alternative
to increasing the minimum wage.
121. In contrast, the Social Security Exemption and Family Allowance Benefit may actually
be more palatable than the EITC to the intended beneficiaries. See supra notes 22, 117, and
accompanying text.
122. The theory is that the benefit to the worker would be the same, whether provided
directly or indirectly. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 287. Cf. Sar A. Levitan & Frank Gallo, The
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit: An Uncertain and Unfinished Experiment, 38 LABOR L.J. 641, 644-47
(1987) (discussing existing wage subsidy paid directly to employers that is meant to encourage
the employment of certain disadvantaged groups, such as veterans, ex-convicts, and persons with
physical or mental disabilities).
123. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 288.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 287-88.
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Admittedly, this arrangement would be much easier to administer than
the existing EITC program for several reasons. First, there are fewer em-
ployers than employees. Second, employers are likely to be more educated
than their employees and may better understand the program and its admin-
istrative requirements. Third, employers are more likely to be generally fa-
miliar with the filing process. 126 However, this arrangement exacerbates the
EITC's compliance problem and creates a perception problem.
1. Compliance
While it is true that the administration of the Employer Credit scheme
would be relatively easy, the scheme may open the door to even greater com-
pliance problems. Under the current EITC system, certain low-wage work-
ers have incentives to overstate their incomes in order to obtain greater
benefits. 127 If a low-wage worker in the phase-in range overstates her earned
income, she receives a larger earned income tax credit. 128 But, because the
regulations require the worker to provide documentation of her income, this
abusive situation generally arises only in cases of self-employed individuals
whose actual income is difficult to determine. 129 However, the Employer
Credit scheme proposed by Professors Yin and Forman creates an incentive,
as well as an opportunity, for many employers to overstate the hours worked
by low-wage individuals in order to reduce the apparent hourly wage and
obtain a larger credit.
For example, suppose an employer and an employee agree on annual
compensation of $10,000 and, for simplicity, that the maximum tax credit is
available to employers of workers earning wages of $5.00 per hour, with
some range of phase-out thereafter. Further assume that the employee is
required to work 1600 hours per year, which equals an hourly wage of $6.25,
or an hourly rate $1.25 above the eligible salary range for the maximum em-
ployer credit. If the employer and employee agreed to report wages as $5.00
per hour based upon 2000 hours rather than $6.25 per hour based upon 1600
hours, the employer would be entitled to the maximum annual credit, while
the employee's annual compensation remained at $10,000.
While it may be unrealistic to assume that employers and their low-in-
come workers would actually collude to obtain the employer credit, it is not
unrealistic to imagine that an employer may condition employment on the
low-wage worker's misrepresentation of the actual number of hours worked.
In yet other circumstances, the low-wage worker may not even be aware of
the overstated hours reported by the employer.
In a perfect market, where information is free-flowing, and everyone in
the labor force has the power to manifest preferences, an employer would
126. Id.
127. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
129. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 259; see also James Aley, A Tax Credit for Crooks?, FOR-
TUNE, Oct. 4, 1993, at 24 (explaining that EITC encourages over-reporting income).
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eventually pass on the full value of the employer tax credit to the worker.
While these assumptions may generally be true, they are not necessarily true
for individuals targeted by the EITC program. Studies show that the typical
individual eligible for the earned income tax credit has limited education.
130
As indicated earlier, 31% of the eligible population has less than a high-
school education and another 46% has only a high-school education.131 This
means that no more than 23% of the population eligible for the credit has
post-high-school education. This lack of formal education is arguably one of
the reasons many eligible individuals frequently do not understand the com-
plicated rules and filing process for the credit and, as a result, fail to
participate. 132
Surely, if lack of education renders a portion of the eligible population
unable to understand the filing requirements for the EITC program, or una-
ware of a program that could provide them a cash benefit, it cannot realisti-
cally be assumed that this same population will have full information about a
tax credit given to an employer on their behalf. As a result, many low-wage
workers may not be able to demand the credit from the employer in the form
of higher wages.
The studies also indicate that the average individual eligible for the
Earned Income Tax Credit has annual wages of $10,808.133 This means that
most of the targeted population earns slightly more than minimum wage1
34
Consequently, these individuals generally have no experience in negotiating
wages, as they are paid only slightly more than the minimum that the law
requires. Therefore, one must conclude that the population targeted by the
EITC would not have sufficient information or bargaining power to demand
that the employer credit be passed on to them in the form of higher wages.
As a result, unlike burdens placed on an employer in a competitive market
which generally pass to the employee in the form of commensurate decreases
in compensation, the benefits given to employers may not pass to their in-
tended beneficiaries in the form of higher wages. 135 Consequently, the em-
ployer credit could prove to be a benefit to the employer who hires low-wage
workers, and not necessarily a benefit to the working poor.
136
130. See Scholz, supra note 18 and accompanying text; Yin et al., supra note 6, at 250.
131. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
133. Yin et al., supra note 6, at 297 tbl. 2.
134. Annual minimum wage salary equals $8840. See supra note 104.
135. Steurle & Bakija, supra note 92, at 1457-58.
136. The underlying structure of this proposal is not new to the tax system. There have
been other employer-based subsidies. For example, in 1978, the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit
(TJTC) was enacted to encourage employers to hire certain impoverished youth. As in the case
of the proposed wage subsidy scheme, Congress expected the TJTC to improve the situation of
the targeted individuals. However, some policymakers believe that in large part the intent of
Congress was subverted because the benefits of the program were not passed on to the targeted
group, rendering the TJTC program substantially ineffective. See Levitan & Gallo, supra note
122, at 644-47 (assessing effectiveness of EITC); Yin et al., supra note 6, at 287 n.205 (discussing




As stated earlier, the EITC has been very successful because the public
perceives it to be well-targeted and exclusively beneficial to the working
poor.137 The public may perceive the employer credit scheme as benefitting
the wealthy employer rather than the low-income worker. Thus, even if one
has complete confidence in the free market and believes that the employer
eventually would be forced to pass on the employer credit in the form of
higher wages to her employees, the problem of perception remains. A per-
ception that wealthy employers were being unjustly enriched at the expense
of the working poor could cause the program to lose its much needed polit-
ical support and popularity.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, one of the most profound changes in America's fight
against poverty has been the development of anti-welfare sentiment reflect-
ing a desire to assist the working poor rather than the non-working poor.
The recent expansion of the EITC exemplifies this trend. To this end,
notwithstanding the practical and perception problems identified, the propos-
als made by Professors Yin and Forman are extremely exciting and innova-
tive. By removing the stigma attached to traditional poverty programs,
reducing the complexity of the program, and eliminating enforcement
problems in the program, the Social Security Exemption and Family Allow-
ance Benefit proposal makes a significant contribution to solving not only
some of the participation and compliance problems unique to the EITC pro-
gram, but also some of the more critical issues pertaining to social reform.
While the Employer Credit scheme may be more problematic, it would seem
that it too is useful to the extent that it stimulates and contributes to ongoing
discussion and recent developments in welfare reform. Moreover, the Em-
ployer Credit introduces a different approach to the existing program and
reorients the tax transfer system. However, both proposals may create seri-
ous problems if they are implemented exactly as proposed. The Social Secur-
ity Exemption and Family Allowance Benefit creates funding and perception
problems. The Employer Credit appears to assume a perfectly competitive
market and to ignore realities about the very individuals to whom the benefit
is targeted. Thus, policymakers intent on reforming the EITC must proceed
cautiously. The possibility that in the near future the EITC is likely to be
ployer Survey, at 24-25, 30-31 (1985) (suggesting that the TJTC has had some impact in amelio-
rating labor market biases faced by targeted job seekers).
137. The recent anti-welfare backlash in America reflects the fear many people feel about
the "morally corrupting influence" of a cash dole for nonworking, but able-bodied poor people.
Many believe that welfare itself is at the root of the problem of intergenerational poverty. See
Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency" from a Different Ground, 81 GEO.
L.J. 1961, 1963 (1993) (recent anti-welfare concerns reflect longstanding, deeply entrenched fear
about morally corrupting influence of cash dole for able-bodied, non-working poor). In contrast,
the EITC enjoys popularity as an anti-poverty program because it encourages work in the phase-
in range, since benefits increase with earned income. See Scholz, supra note 15, at 63.
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used as a substitute for existing relief programs renders this caution even
more necessary. If such a substitution is made, radical changes to the pro-
gram would have far reaching consequences not only for the EITC program,
but also for the overall transfer system. Therefore, all proposed changes to
the EITC should be thoroughly and thoughtfully considered before they are
implemented.

